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Call for

United States

INS

145

Courts to Reevaluate

Policy

Considerations Regarding Female Genital Mutilation as a
Justifiable Reason for Asylum: Abankwah v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999)
Glennys E. Ortega Rubin*
I. Facts
Petitioner, a twenty-nine year old female native of Ghana and a
member of the Nkumssa tribe, was heir to the position of Queen Mother
of her tribe.' In order to become Queen Mother, Nkumssa tribal tradition
mandated that the woman remain a virgin until her marriage. 2 Despite
being aware of this tribal taboo, Petitioner engaged in premarital sex,
violating Nkumssa tradition.3 According to Petitioner, a woman's
punishment for violating the tribal custom is female genital mutilation
(FGM).4 Petitioner, knowing that her lack of virginity would be
discovered on her wedding night, fled to the capital city of Accra.5 After
learning that members of her tribe had come to look for her in the city,
Petitioner purchased a false passport and visa and fled to the United
States .

* (J.D.) University of Florida College of Law, 2001. This Comment is dedicated to my family -my
parents Gregory and Glennys Ortega and my brother Ramon Ortega, for their unconditional love and
for always encouraging me to pursue my dreams, and my new husband Stefan Rubin, without whose
support and guidance this never would have been possible.
I See Abankwah v. Immigration and NaturalizationService, 185 F.3d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1999).
2 Id.
3 See id. The international community has recognized that in some communities mutilating a
female's genital organs is a way to ensure a woman's virginity prior to marriage and chastity after
marriage. See Office of the High Commissions for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 23: Harmful
TraditionalPracticesAffecting the Health of Women and Children, (last visited Oct. 6th 2000) at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs23.htm.
4 See Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 20. The Court elaborated that the type of FGM practiced in Ghana
requires the amputation of the woman's entire clitoris, along with the amputation of part of the labia
minora. See id. Female genital mutilation is the term given to the practice of removing all or part of
a girl or woman's external genitalia for non-surgical reasons. See World Health Organization
(WHO), Female GenitalMutilationReport of a WHO Technical Working Group, Geneva 17-19 July
1995,

4

(last

visited

Sept.

24th

2001)

at

http://www.who.int/frh-

whd/FGM/TechnicalWorkinig Group/English/TechnicalWorkingGroup.htm. [hereinafter WHO
Report].
5 See Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 20.
6 See id. at 20-21.
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Upon her arrival in the United States, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) apprehended Petitioner at John F. Kennedy
Airport in New York and initiated deportation proceedings against her
for illegally entering the United States. At the INS hearing, an
Immigration Judge found that Ghana prohibited the practice of FGM. As
a result, Petitioner could have sought protection from the Ghanaian
government. Nonetheless, Petitioner failed to establish that she had an
objectively reasonable fear of FGM and, consequently, was denied
asylum.8 Petitioner appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the case, stating that Petitioner did not
meet her burden of proving past persecution and that the evidence
Petitioner presented failed to establish a claim of persecution based upon
her membership in a particular social group. 9 The United States Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the BIA's denial of asylum and held
that in determining whether a woman's fear of FGM is valid for asylum
the fear must be sufficiently grounded in reality. l0

II. History
The international community has recognized the practice of
FGM "as a violation of women's and female children's rights."" In fact,
7 See id. at 21.
8 See id. The Immigration Judge noted that Ghana criminalized FGM in 1994. See id. However, only
seven ariests for the crime of FGM have been made in Ghana since 1994. See id. at 25. Additionally,
the Immigration Judge expressly stated that Petitioner should be able to get protection from the
Ghanaian Government or from a non-governmental organization. See id. It is important to note that
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and non-governmental organizations carry out
measures for the protection, sustenance, and resettlement of refugees. See Louis Henkin, et al.,
Human Rights 405 (1999).
9 See Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 21. Persecution is defined as "a program or campaign to exterminate,
drive away, or subjugate a people because of their religion, race, or beliefs." Random House
Dictionary of the English Language, 1444 (2d ed. 1987). Additionally, persecution requires that a
perpetrator cause a victim pain or injury. See Pitcherskaia v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 118 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1997).
10 See Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 26; see also Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 17 F.3d 33, 36 n.2 (2d Cir.
1995); Melendez v. United States Dep"t of Justice, 926 F.2d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1991); Purveegiin v.
United States INS. Processing Center, 73 F. Supp. 2d 411, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(a) (1998).
11 See Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 23 (citing REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, GENERAL RECOMMENDATION No. 14 U.N. GAOR,

45th Sess., Supp. No. 38, at 80, 438, U.N. Doe. A/45/38; THE BEIJING DECLARATION AND THE
PLATFORM FOR ACTION, FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN, BEIJING, CHINA, 4-15
September 1995, U.N. Doe. DPI/1776/Wom (1996); see also OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
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the World Health Organization (WHO) has "condemn[ed] all forms of
FGM and [has] call[ed] for the abolition of the practice. 12 In addition,
the United States Congress13has enacted laws criminalizing the practice of
FGM in the United States.
Recently, the same court that decided the instant case issued its
opinion in Melendez v. United States Department of Justice, establishing
that an asylum applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution when
another individual presented with similar circumstances would have the
same fear. 14 In that case, Melendez, a citizen of El Salvador and a former
member of a political party attempting to secure free and democratic
elections in the region, claimed he experienced continuous threats from
the government and that he was hassled by guerilla forces. 5 Shortly after
his wife's death, Melendez left El Salvador and went to the United States
for the first time. 16 Three months later, Melendez was deported by the
INS.17 Once in El Salvador, Melendez was interrogated, threatened, and
robbed by government soldiers. 18 Later, after an "investigator"

FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

(last visited Oct 6th 2000) at

http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/ing.htm. The World Health Organization (WHO) has estimated that
over 120 million girls and women across the world undergo some form of FGM, and that at least 2
million girls are at risk of having FGM performed upon them every year. See WHO
note 4

REPORT,

supra

Additionally, the WHO recognizes that the damage done by FGM is extensive and

irreversible. See id.
12 WHO REPORT, supranote 4.

13 See 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2001). However, despite Universal Declarations giving individuals the right
to seek asylum in other countries due to persecution, States have been reluctant to assume
obligations. See Henkin, supra note 8, at 405. Human rights scholars have explained that "the
Universal Declaration recognized the right of any individual 'to leave any country, including his
own' and the right to 'seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."' Id. (citing
UDHR arts. 13(2), 14(1)). Two international treaties, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and the Convention's 1967 Protocol, serve as the foundation for current United States
asylum laws. See Michele R. Pistone, Assessing the ProposedRefugee ProtectionAct. One Step in
the Right Direction, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 815, 815-16 (2000). Persecution has been defined by
United States courts as "the threat to life or freedom of, the infliction of suffering or harm upon
those who differ in a way regarded as offensive." Id. (citing In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 22223 (BIA 1995)). Furthermore, the INS has determined that "violence and oppressive acts against
women can constitute human rights violations warranting asylum." See id.
14 See Melendez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 926 F.2d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1991).
15 See id. at 213.
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 See id.

148
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threatened to kill him, Melendez returned to the United States, seeking
asylum.' 9
Determining the proper standard of review for establishing a
well-founded fear of persecution constituted the issue on appeal. 20 The
court found that "the threshold finding of fact of whether the alien has
established a well-founded fear of persecution qualifying that person for
refugee status is reviewable under the substantial evidence test. '21 The
court then explained that in order to satisfy the substantial evidence test,
the applicant must not only show a subjective fear, but must also meet an
component of the test by showing that the fear is grounded in
objective
22
reality.

Just one year later, in Matter of R-, the BIA expanded upon the
Melendez ruling and determined that in order to establish a well-founded
fear of persecution, an applicant must also demonstrate country-wide
persecution or mistreatment by the central government.23 In Matter of R,
the applicant was a twenty-one year old male Sikh from the Punjab
region of India who claimed that Sikh militants had visited his home
24
demanding money and seeking to recruit him for their cause. Later,
after the police discovered the applicant's contact with the Sikh militants,
the police interrogated and physically abused the applicant suspecting
that he was a militant.25 When the applicant returned home, the militants
beat the applicant and attempted to force him to join their ranks.2 6 After

19 See id.
20 Id. at 215-16. Interestingly, although the court found that most circuit courts apply a substantial
evidence test for granting asylum, it noted that the "ultimate denial of asylum is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard." Id. at 216.
21 Id. at 218. According to the instant Court, when a court refers to substantial evidence, it means
"more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." Abankwah v. IN.S., 185 F.3d 18, 23 (2nd Cir. 1999)(quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
22 See Melendez, 926 F.2d at 215; see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca,480 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1987);
Purveegiin v.United States INS. Processing Center, 73 F. Supp. 2d 411,416 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). An
applicant's subjective fear is established when the court finds that the applicant's fear is genuine and
can be based on situations that only affect the applicant personally. See Wendy B. Davis & Angela
D. Atchue, No Physical Harm, No Asylum: Denying A Safe Haven for Refugees, 5 TEX. FORUM
ON CIV. LIB. & CIV. R. 81, 87 (2000)(citing Civil v. Immigrationand NaturalizationService, 140
F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1998)).
23 See Matter of R-, 20 1. & N. Dec. 621, 622 (BIA 1992).
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 See id.
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continuous abuse by both the police and the militants, the applicant left
India and sought asylum in the United States.27
On appeal, the BIA considered whether the applicant could have
avoided the ongoing persecution by going elsewhere in his country
before seeking asylum in the United States.28 The court ruled that in
order for the applicant to prove that he qualifies for asylum, he must
show more than a well-founded fear of prosecution in a particular
place. 29 The applicant must also prove that the fear of persecution exists
country-wide.30 The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence
to suggest that the applicant's fear of persecution existed on a countrywide basis, and thus denied his appeal.31
Finally, in the 1996 landmark case of In re Fuaziya Kasinga, the
BIA acknowledged that FGM can constitute sufficient persecution for
granting asylum. 32 In that case, the applicant was a nineteen year old
female who was a citizen of the country of Togo and a member of the
Tchamba Kunsuntu tribe.33 After her father died and her mother
abandoned her, the applicant's aunt forced her into a polygamous
marriage.34 The applicant testified that all young women in her tribe
underwent FGM at the age of fifteen, but her father sheltered her from
the practice.35 The local police and the Togo government both knew that
the tribe practiced FGM, but refused to protect any of the girls from the

27 See id.

28 See id. at 627. Also, when an individual is incapable of escaping safely to another part of the
country, then even if the harm is being committed by a private actor, the harm may constitute
persecution. See Megan Annitto, Asylum for Victims of Domestic Violence: Is Protection Possible
After Re R-A-?, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 785, 798 (2000).
29 See Matter of R-, 20 1. & N. Dec. at 625.
30 See id. The court noted that implicit in qualifying for refugee status is the notion that an asylum
applicant requires international protection because the applicant is no longer safe in his or her home
country. See id.
31 See id. at 626.
32 See In re Fauziya Kasinga, Interim Decision (BIA) 3278, 1996 WL 379826 (BIA June 13, 1996)
(There are no page references for this document). Scholars have asserted that the Kasinga court, in
recognizing FGM as extreme persecution, gives hope to the woman's cause. See Annitto, supra note
28, at 789.
33 See Kasinga, 1996 WL 379826, at *2.
34 See id. at 3.
35 See id. at 2. The type of FGM that is practiced by the Togo tribe is very extreme and includes the
cutting of the genitalia with knives, which causes extensive bleeding, and requires a forty day
recovery period. See id. at 2.
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practice.3 6 Fearing that her aunt and her new husband would subject her
to FGM before consummating her marriage, the applicant fled to the
country of Ghana.37 Aware that it was impossible for her to live with
another tribe in Togo, and that the Togolese police could locate her in
Ghana, the applicant left for Germany. 8 Once there, she obtained a
British passport and flew to the United States where
she immediately
39
requested asylum at Newark International airport.
On appeal as a case of first impression, the BIA considered
whether fear of FGM could be a basis for granting asylum. 40 Analyzing
this issue, the court recognized that the applicant had a well-founded fear
of persecution because a reasonable person in her position would also
fear return to Togo. 41 The court found that the applicant's fear of
persecution was a result of her membership in a particular social group,
specifically "young women of the Tchamba Kunsuntu [t]ribe who have
not had FGM . . . and who oppose the practice., 42 Noting that the
applicant "would be unable to avoid FGM by moving to some other part
of Togo," the court held that the applicant's fear of persecution existed
country-wide. 43 The court concluded that although a grant of asylum is
always discretionary, the severity of FGM rendered such a grant proper
in the applicant's case.44

II. Instant Case
In the instant case, the Second Circuit similarly held that a
woman in danger of having FGM forced upon her has a reasonable fear of
persecution and qualifies for asylum.45 In beginning its analysis, the
instant Court accepted the international community's recognition of FGM
as a violation of women's rights, and the United States' criminalization of
36 See id. at 3. Critics of the "refugee" concept argue that States often "allow private citizens or
groups to act freely and with impunity to the detriment of rights recognized by the international
human rights regime." See Susan F. Martin & Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Asylum in Practice.
Successes, Failures, and the Challenges Ahead, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 589, 612 (2000).
37 See Kasinga, 1996 WL 379826 at *3.
38 Seeid. at3.

39 See id. at 3.
40 See id. at 2.
41 See id. at 9.
42 See id. at 9-10.
43 See id. at 10.
44 See id. at 10-11.

45 See Abankwah, 185 F.3d 18 at 20. It is important to note that, according to the United States
Supreme Court, an applicant does not have to prove that persecution is certain or more likely than
not. See DAVIS, supranote 22, at 87. The applicant merely has the burden of proving a ten percent
or higher probability of persecution if deported. See id.
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the practice. 46 In establishing the legal framework for its analysis, the
Court clarified that in order for Petitioner to gain asylum in the United
States, she must establish that she fits the definition of a "refugee," which
the Court defined as an individual establishing a "well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion." 47 However, the Court
disregarded the BIA's conclusion that Petitioner failed to establish that
she experienced persecution based on her membership in a particular
social group.48 Furthermore, the Court never explained how Petitioner fit49
into any of the previously mentioned categories of "refugee."
Nonetheless, the Court did state that in order for Petitioner to be a
"refugee," she must also be unable or unwilling to return to her native
country because of a well-founded fear of persecution.
The Court then examined Petitioner's case by applying the
substantial evidence test established in Melendez, whereby a wellfounded fear of persecution is established when a reasonable person
facing similar circumstances would experience similar fears.5 1 The Court
found Petitioner's fear of persecution was completely genuine and
credible, thus she met the first prong of the substantial evidence test
which mandates that the fear must be subjectively real.52 The Court also
noted that by proving that her fear of FGM was objectively reasonable,53
Petitioner met the second prong of the substantial evidence test.

Criticizing the BIA's decision that Petitioner did not provide sufficient
evidence to prove persecution, the Court construed the BIA decision as
"too exacting in both the quality and quantity of evidence that it
required., 5 4 The instant Court relied upon Petitioner's testimony and
affidavit as factual truth that she would be subject to FGM, as was
common tribal punishment for premarital sex.55 The Court also accepted
46 See Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 23.

47 See id. at 22. The Court's definition of "refugee" was in accordance with § 101(a)(42)(A) of the
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (1994). See id;see also IN.S.v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428;
Purveegiin, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 416.

48 See Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 21.
49 See id.
50 See id. at 22.
51 See id. at 23; see also Yong Hao Chen v. Immigrationand NaturalizationService, 195 F.3d 198,

202 (4th Cir. 1999); Huaman Corneliov. Boardof ImmigrationAppeals, 979 F.2d 995, 999 (4th Cir.
1992); M.A. A26851062 v. Immigration and NaturalizationService, 899 F.2d 304, 311 (4th Cir.
1990).
52 See Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 24.

53 See id. at 26.
54 Id. at 24.
55 See id.
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the testimony and affidavit of Victoria Otumfuor, a United States citizen
and Pentecostal minister who was born and raised in Ghana.16 The Court
disregarded Ms. Otumfuor's lack of familiarity with the Nkumssa tribe's
specific practices and accepted her testimony that Petitioner's account
was consistent with her knowledge of the situation in Ghana generally.57
Basing its decision solely on the testimony of Petitioner and Ms.
Otumfuor, the Court concluded Petitioner's fear of FGM to be wellfounded because it was sufficiently grounded in reality. 8
IV. Analysis
The instant Court granted Petitioner asylum "based solely on [her]
fear of future persecution. '59 By doing this, the Court completely disregarded
the standard set forth by the court in Matter of R- which mandated that to
establish a well-founded fear of persecution the applicant must prove
country-wide persecution or mistreatment by the central government." The
Court's failure to address the issue of whether Petitioner's persecution
existed country-wide, which has been the source of many denials of asylum
including the case of Matter of R-, is contrary to precedent.
Additionally, the Court criticized the BIA's strict standard for
requiring evidence and accepted Petitioner's statements as fact. 61 By
placing such an emphasis on Petitioner's and Ms. Otumfuor's
testimonies and affidavits and completely disregarding the need for
additional evidence to prove a well-founded fear of persecution, the
Court made it much easier to establish an asylum claim. However, the
Court failed to acknowledge that the practice of FGM is prohibited in
Ghana.62 The Court also did not recognize that because none of the
tribe's elders had ever approached Petitioner about the possibility of her
becoming Queen Mother, it is questionable whether Petitioner did in fact
have a valid fear of FGM as punishment. 63 Thus, while there is no
56 See id. at 25-26.
57 See id.

58 See id.
59 See Davis, supra note 22, at 115.

60 See Matter of R-, supra note 23 at 625 (BIA 1992).
61 See Annitto, supra note 28, at 796 (citing Karen Musalo, Matter of R-A-: An Analysis of the
Decision and Its Implications, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASED, 1177, 1186 (1999)). In regards to the
amount of evidence needed to prove persecution, courts have agreed that the applicant "must show
that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the
requisite fear of persecution." INS. v. Elias-Zacarias,502 U.S. 478, 478-479 (1992).
62 See supra note 8.
63 See Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 20. In the instant case, FGM was a punishment for a woman in the
position of Queen Mother having engaged in premarital sex, whereas in Kasinga, FGM was a tribal
tradition for all young female members of the tribe. See id., See also supra note 32.
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question that FGM is a severe form of persecution, the Court's failure to
require substantial evidentiary support for Petitioner's claim makes the
approval of asylum not only easier, but almost completely discretionary.
Another potential problem not addressed by the instant Court is
the inadequacy of the current international and domestic U.S. law to
provide a more appropriate basis for analyzing the unique problems of
refugee women.64 The lawful definition of "refugee" only encompasses
individuals whose well-founded fear of persecution is "on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion., 6 ' The refugee woman's particular needs are ignored,
and she is forced to seek asylum based on previously defined categories
that do not take into account gender-specific persecution such as FGM.66
The Kasinga court admitted the applicant as a "refugee" because it found
her to be a member of a particular social group.67 While establishing
FGM as a ground for asylum in future cases, the Kasinga court was
forced to categorize the applicant into the existing definition of "refugee"
under the law.68
However, when the instant Court considered whether to grant
Petitioner asylum, it completely omitted this aspect of the analysis. It
stated that in order to grant Petitioner asylum, she must prove that she is
a "refugee" by definition. In the end, the Court only applied the
substantial evidence test set forth in Melendez and held that Petitioner
64 See Bret Thiele, Persecution on Account of Gender: A Need for Refugee Law Reform, 11
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 221, at 221 (2000). The condition of refugee women, who consist of
the majority of refugees, is grave. See Henkin, supra note 8, at 405. According to the U.S.
Committee for Refugees, World Refugee survey, "as of December 31, 1998, the world had some 13
million refugees." See id. As a matter of fact, women and girl child refugees constitute "eighty
percent of the total world refugee population." UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE
HUMAN RIGHTS, 50th Anniversary of the Declarationof Human Rights (last visited Oct. 6, 2000) at

http://www.unhchr.ch/html/50th/50kit2.htm.
65 See Thiele, supra note 64, at 222 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §
1101 (a)(42)(A)(West 2000)). It is important to note that "sexual violence and other gender-related
abuses can constitute persecution under the U.N. Refugee convention definition of refugee." Thiele,
supra note 64, at 236 (citing AMNESTY INT'L, REFUGEES: HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE No BORDERS 114

(1997)).
66 See Thiele, supra note 64, at 222.
67 Kasinga, 1996 WL 3798626, at *9-10.
68 The Kasinga decision is indicative of a recent trend to increase protection of refugee women. See
Henkin, supra note 8, at 420. "That trend includes greater sensitivity to forms of persecution directed
against women on account of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. It also includes
recognition of some forms of gender-based persecution under the rubric of persecution on account of
membership in a particular social group." Id.
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had a well-founded fear of persecution based solely upon that test.
Failing to establish that Petitioner was a member of a particular social
group, the Court ignored another pertinent part of the analysis involved
in granting asylum. v
Although the instant Court granted asylum to Petitioner for fear
of unwanted FGM, as the Kasinga court did, the instant Court failed to
recognize the inherent differences between Kasinga and Petitioner.7' In
Kasinga, the applicant's tribe performed FGM on all young female
members of the tribe, as tribal tradition.72 In the instant case, FGM was
73
not tribal tradition but a punishment for violating a sacred custom.

Unlike Kasinga, who would be subject to FGM by her tribe despite her
actions, Petitioner would have never been exposed to FGM had she not
knowingly and voluntarily violated her tribal law. 74 Thus, Kasinga
needed international protection because of her membership in a
particular social group that was persecuted, whereas Petitioner, by her
own volition, brought FGM upon herself.

Conclusion
Based upon the facts, the instant Court improperly granted
Petitioner asylum. As a result, the Court's decision will certainly impact
future asylum cases, especially those involving claims based on FGM.
Applying the instant decision, future applicants seeking asylum based
upon their fear of having FGM inflicted upon them without their consent
will have to meet a significantly lower threshold of proof. Strict
adherence to the instant Court's standards allows an applicant to prevail
in an asylum claim by providing the court with a merely plausible story,
which could result in courts improperly granting asylum.

69 See Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 22-23.
70 See id. at 26.
71 See id.

72 Kasinga, 1996 WL 379826 at #2.
73 See Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 20.
74 See id.

